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A Philosophical Critique of Evolution as a Concept

Given the assorted ways in which the concept of Evolution has been used, misused and abused, I feel it necessary to explain prior to everything else what this critique is not about before saying what the critique is infact about. 

1. This paper does not deny the fact of Cosmological Evolution. I accept the theory of Evolution to be a scientifically established theory whose basic principles are beyond any reasonable doubt. The paper is not, therefore, an attempt to refute the theory as it stands. 

2. This paper is not a scientific paper, nor does it pretend to be one. It does not provide a theory for predicting new observations or interpreting existing ones; nor does it attempt a novel explanation of the available empirical data. 

3. This paper has nothing to do with the Intelligent Design Movement, nor does it participate in the intellectual and political debates surrounding it. It is not a contribution to that genre. Neither does it deal with the theological or atheological implications of the Evolutionary Theory, macro-evolution or otherwise. 

When, then, is this all about? This paper is a genuine, unique attempt to understand by way of analysis the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of Evolution per se, in itself, both at the epistemological and logical levels. For I believe a better, epistemically sound understanding of its logic will help to provide a more secure and satisfactorily coherent concept of Evolution as understood in the physical and temporal sciences today. 

To avoid possible misunderstanding and further misconception, it will be worth the while to explore quite a few uses of the word “Evolution”, and the “type of evolution” that will be critiqued here. 

“Evolution” in the broadest sense of the word, maybe used synonymously or near synonymously to the phrase “change across time and space”. We do not, therefore, limit the use of the word ‘evolution’ to organisms only – but include in our study geological evolution, stellar evolution; infact, cosmological evolution itself. It is in this very broad sense the term will be understood and used in this paper – unless otherwise contextually specified.
Unfortunately, the phrase “change across time and space” does not really illuminate, for there are different ways in which objects, things and events change with time, and that in varying degrees. For the present purpose I shall limit the use of the word ‘change’ to bio-physical objects, things and events; so I am not concerned with socio-political or economic or ideological changes – or what maybe called “manmade changes”. 
Even with this limitation provided, physical objects undergo both short-term changes and long-term changes – in other words, all changes are not the same. 






Type 1:	The pacing replacement of human cells by new ones within split seconds, maybe considered a most rapid form of change, or ‘rapid evolution’. 
This type of evolution is characterized by the attribute that the change is observable to the senses, either by the aid of microscopes and other such instruments, or simply directly by our natural senses. In short, Type 1 Evolution refers to the process of change perceptible by our senses. And because there is sound, observational evidence to support this form of change, I will uncritically accept it in this paper​[1]​. 

Type 2:	The change that takes place in the composition, shape and size and appearance of the human body from the embryonic to infantile to childhood stage, and further to adolescence and ultimately to old age and death, is an example of change that maybe considered mildly rapid (say, the change taking place within a century at most). 
The essential feature of Type 2 Evolution is that the evolutionary process is itself unobservable to the senses. However, while it is virtually impossible to actually observe this type of change – the growth and change in human physiology for instance – the presence of observational instances at different points in our lifetime as substantiated by our memory and the testimony of our friends will be sufficient for our purpose to not critique this type of change. Note that it will be proper to say we have epistemic knowledge of this type of evolution on the basis of our personal memories and the testimony of our friends (although sensory evidence is lacking). 

Type 3:	There is yet another type of change: the evolution of our surrounding environs and even the air itself that we breathe. 
Unlike type 1, we cannot observe the evolutionary process involved here, because this type takes a comparatively longer time to change; and again, this type of change is unlike Type 2 Evolution as the changes in question now occur before our birth and prior to the birth of our friends and relatives and therefore, neither memories nor hearsay testimonies can provide justification for our knowledge of this type of evolution. How then do we know New York City was once a wasteland where Red Indian fishers once fished along the Brooklyn Bridge? We know so because historians tell us the present location of New York City was a wasteland only 400 years ago; and because oral tradition passed down corroborated the evidence provided by the historians. 
But why trust oral transmissions or the accounts of historians; are their testimonies reliable? The transmissions and accounts are trustworthy, we will presume​[2]​, because there are extensive literary records to show that New York area was not what it is today, and that generations tell their succeeding generations what the world of their time was like. So, on the strength of the presence of literary records and oral traditions, we shall not critique or doubt the evolutionary fact of this type of change. 
By making this concession, because it is not relevant for our purpose, we may assume as trustworthy in principle all type of knowledge we obtain by means of literary records and oral traditions. This will, therefore, push our evolutionary timetable to the time when human language developed – or evolved. That is, supposing the first homo sapiens developed speech some 50,000 years ago, we maybe sure the evolutionary knowledge we have is trustworthy upto 50,000 years ago​[3]​: that is, to the beginning of history itself when oral tradition took off. 
This means that I am not interested in investigating whether historical evolution takes place across time (I assume that it does); rather, my interest shall be in critiquing the type of evolution that takes place in pre-historical times – and this from the epistemological perspective. So I ask: how do we know such type of evolution did occur? 

Before rushing to answer, note that each of the 3 types of evolution so far considered, differ from each other in the manner in which we know of their truth: the types do not share a similar degree of epistemic warrant; their epistemic justification, significantly differs. 
That is, we know Type 1 Evolution to be true solely on the evidence of our senses (or microscopes if you will) – because we can observe the very process of change taking place. 
We do not, however, know Type 2 Evolution on the basis of sensory evidences, for the simple reason such type of change is not observable to our senses​[4]​; rather, we know Type 2 Evolution to be true on the basis of our personal memory and public testimony of others. 
Lastly, in the Type 3 Evolution, neither our senses nor memories nor testimonies can tell us this type of evolution takes place. Instead, we know Type 3 Evolution to be the case on the basis of literary records and oral traditions. 
Note also that all the evidential sources of Type 3 Evolution are also available to Type 2 Evolution (although not vice-versa): that is, both literary records and oral traditions can corroborate the fact that Type 2 Evolution does take place. Likewise, all the evidential sources of Type 2 Evolution (and by logical implication, those of Type 3 as well) are present in Type 1 Evolution although not vice-versa; that is, literary records, oral traditions, memories and testimonies may help to corroborate evidence of our senses to the effect that Type 1 Evolution certainly occurs.

From these two observations we may draw the reasonable inference as a general principle that, all things equal, the length of time involved in the evolutionary process, is inversely proportional to the evidential information we have​[5]​. That is, the greater the length of time, the lesser our ability to confirm whether evolution takes place or does not take place; and the lesser the length of time involved, the greater our ability to know the process of evolution at work.
So far, this point should not be taken to mean we have no idea whether evolution occurs or not when it comes to history (or beyond) – or to processes involving very lengthy periods. The only conclusion to be drawn is that the number of sources by which we can confirm whether evolution takes place, diminish as the length of time involved stretches. We shall call the aforementioned principle as “The Temporal progression of Evolutionary Evidence” (or simply, TPE). 

I have already said my concern is not to analyse the type of evolution that takes place in historical times either in geography or biology or in the world of physics within the temporal frame specified. So I shall assume evolution does truly occur and our knowledge of such occurrence is quite accurate insofar as the timetable refers to events and processes in our history. But not beyond. This means we are assuming the knowledge we have concerning Types 1, 2 and 3 Evolutions, is, in principle, fairly accurate. 

Now we shall designate the entire historical time frame covered by these three types of Evolution, simply as The Evolutionary Present. That is, in this paper, we shall use the word “present” to refer to that time period between the dawn of human language and the 21st century where we remain today. By implication, we shall call the prehistoric past as The Evolutionary Past. 






Each of these sources, at least in principle​[6]​, possesses differing degrees of epistemic weight: that is, generally speaking, for whatever reason, we trust sensory evidence as most reliable, followed by the evidence of our memory and testimony of other people, then of literary records and oral transmissions, which came last. 
Now, for reasons already mentioned, as it is beyond doubt none of these 5 evidential sources can help us in our knowledge of the prehistoric past –
i) either we know of the prehistoric past with the help of other evidential sources so that our knowledge of the prehistoric past is more reliable or atleast as reliable as our historical knowledge; or 
ii) the knowledge we have of the prehistoric past is less reliable than our knowledge of history. 

The second option is most unfortunate and disgusting, so we shall explore the possibility the first option is the case: that is, the possibility that we know of the prehistoric past on the basis of other evidential sources aside from these five. Then we shall see whether these evidential sources are in principle more reliable than the five. 

Enter the Scientific Method. 

Without digressing into the controversial nuances surrounding the nature, scope and justification of scientific knowledge that makes up much of the field called Philosophy of Science as it is​[7]​, I shall directly deal in a way relevant to our inquiry a concept which much of science presupposes: the concept of Causality​[8]​. 
Broadly understood, Causality simply refers to a relationship between an event A and another event B, where A occurs temporally prior to B and so, A serves as the cause and B serves as the effect. For the present purpose, we may consider temporal priority of the cause over the effect to be a necessary condition for causality to work between the two events – but not a sufficient condition, for it must also be the case that B would not have occurred had A did not occur​[9]​. 
I shall not get into the interesting specifics philosophers use to dabble with when studying Causality for the simple reason that it is irrelevant for our present purpose; suffice that the reader understands the concept of Causality as explicated above. 

It is easy to see the manner in which Causality is intimately connected with the “arrow of time”, or the progression of time – and therefore, of evolution. It is also easy to see that knowledge of the past presuppose the operation of causality. If we may return to examples illustrating the aforementioned three types of Evolution, we may say the death of old cells act as causes that enables new cells to develop as effects; we may say my physiological condition at age 4 or 5 causes the developed condition at age 6 or 7, for it would have been biologically impossible for me to have a 6 or 7 year old’s physiology without first having a 4 or 5 year old’s physiology at a prior time; and finally, we may say the conditions of New York in 1660 helped to shape (and therefore cause) the New York as we now know it – for, were the wasteland that New York was in 1660 different from what it really was and, instead, say, the area was infact a huge forest, the present conditions would have also correspondingly changed from what it is now. 
Because we can detect a causal chain in each of the three types of Evolution so far considered, and because (we suppose) the three types exhaust all evolution that takes place during the Evolutionary Present, we may say causality is at work throughout the Evolutionary Present. 

But what of scientific knowledge – do scientific knowledge 
1) rely on evidential sources other than the 5 earlier mentioned; and 
2) do they presuppose causality as well? 
We shall first deal with the second, easier question – which will supply an answer to the first. 
It is a fact scientific knowledge presupposes the operations of causality in nature – and, were there no causal chain, knowledge of nature would have been impossible. I shall show this to be the case in a round about way by dealing with the notions of observation and experiment​[10]​ - two acid tests of scientific theories that lie at the heart of the scientific method. 

It is common knowledge that the scientist use observations and experiments to test the hypothesis he develops concerning a data in question in order to explain that data and others, and perhaps, predict the behaviour of other relevantly similar data​[11]​. 
Ideally, empirical observations and experiments act as touchstone rules on which scientific hypothesis are tested: if a hypothesis does not fit the available data, the hypothesis is (ideally) automatically discarded (or revised, in which case it becomes another) and another hypothesis sought for to explain the facts in question. If, however, the hypothesis fits the raw data and experiments serve to verify the hypothesis, the hypothesis is alleviated to the status of a theory; and if all the available data substantiates the theory while most of its predictions come to pass (with none refuted), the theory is ballooned to the honorific status of being called a ‘scientific law’​[12]​. 
Simplistically understood, a scientific law is therefore a generalization of numerous empirical instances that confirms its truth. This means that a scientific law is sound and valid only because it fits the facts so well; only because it explains the facts so well. 

Now we ask: what if the facts change – say, a set A of facts in 50,000 B.CE evolves till it was replaced by a set B of facts in 50,000 C.E, so that the sets A and B share nothing in common? Do the scientific laws then cease to be sound because the laws are dependent on the facts of set A for their truth, and as set A has now been replaced by the facts of set B? We shall let this question dangle and return to it at a more favourable time. Meanwhile, let us continue pursuing our previous line of thought where we explore the relationship between observation and experiment on the one hand and causality on the other. Keep in mind, however, that because scientific laws depend upon observational and experimental instances for their truth, everything said about observations and experiments will logically apply to the scientific laws dependent on them​[13]​. 

Now, take the Newtonian observation “an apple falls to the ground​[14]​”. The causal chain that connects an apple from time t1 when it is still in the tree and t2 when it has fallen to the ground, is provided by a scientifically sound but quite undefined concept we all know as gravity. The phenomenon of gravity acts as the causal medium that enables an object to fall. That planets remain firm in their orbit is due to the pull of the sun’s powerful gravity: this means that the gravity of the sun causes the planets to remain in their orbit, so that, were the sun’s gravity no longer to be, the planets will soon remove themselves from their present orbit. 
Gravity can therefore be understood as a causal link between two objects enabling it to act in a certain sort of way (analogically playing the medium role language does in communication) – or even of one object acting in a certain sort of way across different periods of time. And as all matter in the universe possesses gravity, by logical implication, all matter in the universe has causal chains. So our second question is answered: on matters of observation (and experiment by extension), the presence of causality is undeniable​[15]​. 
But if gravity, causality and such phenomenon are regarded as presuppositions of observations and experiments or considered simply as observational instances (for the sake of simplicity), what implication does this have for the present concern? To this question we now turn. 

Observations, all empirical observations, are, directly or indirectly, based on the testimony of our senses. We do not see the movement of planets; but with the help of telescope that magnifies the power of our senses (so to speak), we see that the planets make solar revolutions; or, what comes to the same, were there another frame of reference, were an observer to look at the solar system from outside, he would have observed the planets to elliptically orbit the sun. This means that, directly or indirectly, our knowledge of the movement of planets and therefore, the gravitational effects of the sun (which we consider to be observational instances_, are infact epistemically dependent on the evidence of our senses​[16]​. 
In short, because all scientific knowledge (facts, principles, laws, etc) are derived from observations and experiments and these in turn are dependent on the sensory fact that we can make observations and experimentations, all scientific knowledge are, by implication, partly but necessarily dependent on the evidence of our senses for their validity​[17]​. This tentatively answers our first question – whether scientific knowledge relies on evidential sources other than the 5 – because the answer is ‘no’: all the physical sciences ultimately rely on the testimony of our senses. Namely, the first of the five evidential sources we previously mentioned.

The argument can be relevantly strengthened by drawing on familiar examples from the special sciences. 
Take the chemical observation “a single hydrogen molecule combines with two oxygen molecules to form water”. This is a point of fact, and we know of this fact by experimental observation, when the chemist sees this to be the case. Thus, although the chemical reaction will still occur and water will continue to be H2O were there no observers, the fact such reaction is observable and that such reaction is indeed observed, means our knowledge of water’s chemical composition, is itself dependent on evidence of the senses. Put it another way: were we all blind, there is no way for us to know water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen molecules. 
We need not bother ourselves with further examples to show all scientific knowledge ultimately derive their validity from sensory evidences, directly or indirectly – namely, to the first of the 5 evidential sources we identify earlier. 

All appears well and good – but, alas, for all practical purpose, we cannot perceive the past. Time once past is past: it no longer is, and the senses no longer assist us. We may observe the movement of planets; but what we observe is, pace the theory of Special Relativity, the present movement of planets from our point of reference. We had earlier noted how sensory evidence provides epistemic justification for Type 1 Evolution only. How then do we know planets did move around the sun yesterday and will do so tomorrow; or that hydrogen molecules combine with oxygen molecules not only this year but also in the past year and in the many preceding years? How do we know the law of inertia was operational in the past millennia – or that nature still selects the fittest a million or two million years ago? 
Herein we appeal to induction via causality – or simply, causal induction; and, like it or not, in varying degrees, our knowledge is aided by evidences obtained from the other 4 evidential sources. 

How do I know the apple that falls to the ground today did so a hundred years ago and will continue to do so a hundred years hence? 
First, because all observational instances confirm the proposition of free fall. But it is impossible for me or anyone or even Newton to observe all apples in history and all apples that will continue to grow and ripen: in short, it is impossible to observe all observational instances. How then do I arrive at the proposition “all objects fall to the ground under the weight of gravity”? This I do by using the principle of induction​[18]​: from particular instances of seeing several objects falling to the ground, I generalize to the universal proposition “all objects do so”. 
I then test this hypothesis: first, I verify whether objects do indeed fall to the ground and when I see that it does, I intend to falsify it by making observations to see whether some objects do not fall. As I cannot find a counterexample to falsify it​[19]​, I consider the universal proposition valid and sound and so, a scientific one. This, in short, is the method by which induction is used in science. 
But induction is not enough: when dealing with the past and the future, causality is a necessity. That is, when I say “all objects fall to the ground”, I am not making a statement about present objects alone, but objects across all time in almost a tenseless manner. My proposition “all objects fall to the ground” is generalized not only inductively, but temporally: meaning, objects of the past has fallen to the ground and objects of the future will continue to faithfully fall to the ground. 

But what justification do I have for making this temporal generalization – when, after all, it is impossible for our senses to perceive objects of the past and meticulously check whether they fall to the ground? Like it or not, the only justifiable means I posses for making such a generalization, is by appealing to my memories of the past and the nostalgic memories of my friends, to literary and other records about the past, and by tenacious oral transmissions from the past. There is no other way. 
How does the biologist know mitochondrion is the power house of the cell not just today but just as well in the past days (and presumably, though this is a moot point, ever since the cell first evolved)? Because the biologist observes mitochondrion to perform that function it does not just today, but he remembers that every time he observed the cell under his fascinating microscope, the results are all banally the same. But it is not just his personal observation that counts: there is also the testimony of others, of his fellow biologist – they obtain the same results equally banally. And not just they, but literary records exist from history that, ever since the invention of the microscope and the first observation of the cellular structure those quite many centuries ago, biologists have noted mitochondrion to be the major source of the cell’s chemical energy. In this manner, we maybe certain the biologist’ observation “mitochondrion is the power house of the cell” is true not just today, but also yesterday and will be so tomorrow as well. There is no other way to confirm its truth. 

Let us not, however, be hasty in making such an arrogant claim; perhaps there are other evidential sources I have failed to consider.

It is time we return to the question of causality. 
One of the achievements of the scientific revolution is the separation of the physical from the social sciences and therefore, the invention of the scientific method by which the causal network of physical and biological objects are seen to be fundamentally different from the causal networks of socio-economic and psycho-political and other humanistic facts. That gravity is the phenomenon which causes an apple to fall to the ground, is, although an observation first scientifically made by Newton, considered to be true not just about the apples of Newton’s day, but the apples that came before him and after; and this is so because the cause-and-effect relationship of an apple before and after it falls, consistently operates without fail. 
It is the absence of counterexamples, the presence of repetitive confirmations, the ability to pass all attempts at falsification, the constant verification by innumerable observations and experiments, which make the Newtonian observation a scientific one – and the hypothesis of gravitation he postulated, to be a scientific law operating on most material objects. What all this means in our humane language is that the evidence of our senses, the testimony of our memories and the memories of others, the records of history and of oral tradition – all these contributed to our knowledge that the law of gravitation is a scientific one. This means that, because our epistemic knowledge of a particular causal network is itself dependent on the 5 evidential sources, the appeal to a consistent performance of causality as the 6th evidential source on which scientific knowledge rest is doomed: causality is not another evidential source independent from the five. 
The presence of a causal relationship between material objects or between an object at t1 and t2 and tn rebuts the possibility of another evidential source from the 5 we earlier noted; that is, as causality cannot function unaided, as a causal observation cannot be considered valid unless faithfully attested by sensory evidence and memories (in the very least), causal knowledge is impossible. Conclusion: sooner or later, when the epistemic justification for a scientific claim is sought for, you will bump into one of the five evidential sources. 

We have earlier conceded our knowledge of evolutionary development of man and his environment that take place between the Evolutionary Present, to be reliable, on the basis that they are justified by atleast one of the 5 evidential source. Now we have seen that all forms of scientific knowledge itself can be justified only by appeal to atleast one of the 5 evidential sources – meaning our earlier hope that scientific knowledge is justified on the basis of a source other than the 5, is found to be a pipedream. This means that our knowledge of The Evolutionary Past – the biological, geological and cosmological past – can be justified only on the basis of these 5 evidential sources. So we have to ask ourselves: is this possible? Can sensory evidence, human memories, literary accounts and oral traditions, help us know the Evolutionary past? If so, how; if not, why not? 

Of the 5 sources, we may rule out the literary accounts and oral traditions to simplify the investigation. Which of course leave sensory evidence, memories and testimonies as the only sources. 
In our example about the biologist’ investigation of the mitochondrion, we have seen how memories of the researcher in concern and testimonies of his colleagues and that of past literary records, were intimately involved in the knowledge and gathering of scientific data. Fact of the matter is that, when making scientific propositions that holds true not only for the present but also the past and (presumably) for the future, the aid of the scientist’ memory and the testimony of his colleagues and other researches past and present, is not just useful but simply unavoidable. The very fact that scientific knowledge is cumulative suggests it is virtually impossible to severe connections with the past researches of past generations; for, the background knowledge plays integral role in setting up a paradigm within which a research will be conducted. 
This background knowledge – or “laden theories” as Popper would have it – that sets up a paradigm within which a scientist functions, can be obtained only if one is familiar with the background knowledge. But familiarity comes only by remembering what one must be familiar about; and we remember, or know, of such background knowledge only by the aid of our memories. Memory, therefore, plays paramount role in the investigation of a scientist, for it is by linking knowledge gathered in the past (by whatever means obtained) with his current research, that he constructs hypothesis and nurture theories. What this means is simple: to acquire knowledge, memory and testimony play an indispensable role. We cannot do without them. Thus, the answer to the question “What evidential sources play role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge”, is, simply: memory and testimony (among other sources). 
The importance of memory in the epistemic process of knowing, is not confined to scientific investigation: infact, in order to know anything at all – be it about the nature outside or the nature within us all; be it about our human societies or animal societies (assuming the two are different) – our personal memory and the testimony of others, play an indispensable role.

From the above observation we may come to a general proposition: 
Memory and Testimony are indispensable evidential sources for acquiring any kind of scientific knowledge.

Having said that, it is noteworthy memory and testimony themselves are ultimately dependent upon sensory evidences for their justification. When a biologist investigates the structure of the cell and recollects his past observations and background knowledge, such appeal to his memory is indirectly an appeal to past sensory evidences. For it is to the sensory observations he made in the past, or the sensory observations made by other scientists in the past, to which he appeals when using his memory. This means that sensory evidences are, among the 5 evidential sources we cited, the ultimate arbiter of any form of empirical knowledge. We shall call this truth “Primacy of the Senses”. The sensory evidence maybe acquired in the past or presently; in either case, both are still sensory and so, the phrase “primacy of the senses”, is legitimate. 

Having said that, knowledge obtained from the present senses, are in general more trustworthy than knowledge obtained from the past senses – or past observations. This is a basic epistemic truth: if there were a conflict in observation between the present observations and observations of the past, and if the conflict still persists after obtaining the same results on the basis of repetitive observations and/or experiments, the evidence of the present senses will be accepted and the contradicting evidence of the past senses, discarded (ideally, that is). It is this basic epistemic truth that permits the growth of scientific knowledge and correction of past mistakes through the process of trial and error: that the present is considered to have epistemic supremacy over the past. We shall call this Primacy of the Sensory Present. 

Almost superfluously, can draw the following two conclusions from the above analysis: 
1. 	Given the primacy of the senses, all empirical claims must be verified by sensory evidences in order to be valid and acceptable. 
2.	Given the primacy of the sensory present, all epistemic claims must be ultimately judged on the basis of the empirical data that holds true in the present – not in the past. 

Now we ask again: how do we obtain knowledge of the Evolutionary Present – of the evolutionary process that occurs between 50,000 B.CE and the 20th century CE? Obviously it is through the 5 evidential sources - but we must now qualify this answer. Given the Primacy of the Senses, we shall now say: it is by direct or indirect sensory evidences that we come to know of the changes occurring during the Evolutionary Present. Obviously, direct sensory evidence of the past is impossible simply because nobody can observe the past (discrediting clairvoyant revelations, time travel stories and past hallucinations); so all sensory evidences must be of the indirect kind. 

But what does the phrase “indirect sensory evidence” means? 
Let us return to the example concerning the evolution of New York. Nobody alive saw the New York of 1660 – so it is just factually impossible for anyone to see the condition of New York at that time. So, direct sensory evidence is impossible. Q.E.D. And nobody remembers the New York of 1660 for the simple reason nobody alive today was also alive in the 17th century (if one were to discount the hypothesis of the Wandering Jew and other related hypothesis); so, neither memory nor testimony of others, can help us know the condition of New York as it was then. This leaves us with literary records and oral traditions as the only evidential sources. 
But literary records themselves, and oral transmissions, were the result of observations – of sensory evidences coupled with personal memories and public testimonies – made by people who lived in the 17th century. This means literary records and oral traditions were in turn dependent upon observations. 
Be that as it is, as the sensory observations were past sensory observations, evidences gathered from this kind of observation, may simply be called indirect sensory evidence. What this means is that indirect sensory evidence comes to us the living via literary records and oral traditions of them the dead. There seems to be no other way. In other words, our knowledge of the Evolutionary Present, while derived from literary records and oral traditions, are also ultimately dependent upon sensory evidences – albeit indirect sensory evidences. 

Unfortunately, as already noted, literary records extend only upto the invention of writing (which for convenience’s sake maybe placed at 10,000 B.CE) and oral traditions upto the evolution of human language and speech (which maybe placed at 50,000 B.CE). From this fact, because indirect sensory evidence can come only through literary records and oral traditions and because it is impossible to know of history except through indirect sensory evidence, must we not conclude that, while we can know of the Evolutionary Present, we cannot know anything about the Evolutionary Past? 
Let us stress this point by example. We know the Britain of Roman times was virtually uninhabited – infact, the area around London was an amazingly wild forest further untamed by the Druids – because there are literary records which inform us so. And we know there was such a river called Saraswati during the Vedic times because oral traditions transmit this information. But how do we know of things and events that occur prior to the invention of writing on the one hand, and the evolution of human speech on the other?

Here I maybe accused of being unscientific on the basis that science seeks after regularities in nature, or laws of nature; and that it is through these laws we know of the past, not through manmade literary records or man-dependent oral tradition. But this accusation is unfounded. Why so? 
Recall that we had shown earlier that observations and experiments are the basis on which scientific laws and principles are constructed; and that, observations and experiments are, by their very nature, dependent upon the senses. But we cannot observe the past; so, how then do we know the laws that hold today, also hold in the days gone by? 
With the aid of memory and public testimony, the scientist can easily tell us that all his observations had shown planets to orbit the sun in ellipses and so, Kepler’s orbital laws hold in the past atleast upto the moment when the first scientist started making his astute observation. But how do we know the planets follow the same elliptical course before I or any alive today, chanced to be born? Do we not know of this through literary records and oral traditions; for Kepler made observations to show that to be the case? And for the sake of argument, let us assume that not just during Kepler’s time, but during the entire span of human history upto 50,000 B.CE, people have observed the elliptical movement of planets, thereby confirming the laws to hold true for all human history​[20]​. So yes, I shall concede that it is through such evidential sources like literary records and oral traditions that we know the planets move in ellipses throughout the entire Evolutionary Present. 

But here lies the rub: what of the Evolutionary Past itself? If indirect sensory evidences via literary records and oral traditions are the only evidential sources by which we can know the past, would not the absence of literary sources and oral traditions to record or tell the type of planetary movement in the pre-Evolutionary Present, mean it is impossible for us to know the kind of evolution that took place during the Evolutionary Past? I do not here deny there is such a thing as time and change before the Evolutionary Present; rather, I’m inquiring what epistemic warrant we have for thinking we know of the Evolutionary Past, given the absence of literary records and oral traditions to tell us the state of affairs as it were then. 

Obviously this answer will not satisfy the scientific pundit, for he would like to believe scientific laws and principles that explain the facts, are somehow eternally braided as underlying the very structure of the universe. The scientist believes (and so do most of the scientifically-educated public) that the laws of physics and science in general that govern the physical universe in the Evolutionary Present, also governs the universe and everything in it during the Evolutionary Past – infact throughout the entire cosmic history. 
He believes with all the fibre in his bones that these physical laws are fundamentally different from non-physical laws; and although he will be hard-pressed to tell exactly the difference between these two types of laws if asked for – the physical and the non-physical – his answer will probably be that physical laws are mathematically certain while non-physical laws are not; or atleast, can be quantitatively expressed in the language of mathematics with a certain degree with certitude. 

There is indeed no doubt the laws of physics (atleast) are mathematically describable and are so described accordingly. But it remains to be wondered if this retort hits the point: for one, not all laws of nature are mathematical (the law of natural selection underlying evolutionary biology, to begin with); and even if they are all mathematical, that status by no means implies their validity during the Evolutionary Past. For it may well be the case the Evolutionary Past has a set of natural laws different from ours (say, where planetary motion does not obey Kepler’s laws, but follows some other laws, say “X-laws”)– and yet, those set of laws, are still mathematically describable. 

That being said, there is a most important point to make. To insist the current laws of nature holds true also in the Evolutionary Past, is another way of saying physical objects have essences that do not change across time and for which reason, the present laws can apply to the state of affairs as it existed back in the distant past. In other words, there are relevant attributes of empirical objects we know as facts which do not change across space and time because – it is in their essence to be the way it is. 
Let us take Kepler’s laws again. Kepler’s laws describe, so far as we know, the planetary motion between any two heavenly objects under classical mechanics. What this means is that any two objects in orbit will obey Kepler’s orbital laws and will move exactly the way the law states. But that is to commit those physical objects to a metaphysical fact: that these planetary objects obey Kepler’s laws because it is in their nature to do so, and it is impossible for the objects to move otherwise. For if the objects move otherwise, it would mean the laws describing their motion would have to be different from the laws we have presently and therefore, Kepler’s laws would not be true. 
And if we were to generalize this argument, it means, either –
1)	that scientific laws do not change because physical objects they describe have essences that do not change across space and time; or
2)	that physical objects do change because they lack any permanent essence and therefore, scientific laws change as well. 

Let us see the implication of either the alternative. 

If we were to accept the second alternative, it means we are committed to the proposition that the present state of affairs differ from the past state of affairs in such a manner the laws describing the present state of affairs differ from the laws describing the past state of affairs. But if this were the case, it would mean, would it not, that it is impossible to know the Evolutionary Past? 
Let us dig the point further. The Evolutionary Past refers to that period of time where all of the 5 evidential sources we stated, are epistemically irrelevant; and so, the only way we can know of the Evolutionary Past is if we assume the laws working in the Evolutionary Present, also works in the Evolutionary Past, thereby committing us to the metaphysical position physical objects have immutable essences. But this is exactly what alternative two denies; alternative two denies the presence of any immutable essences in physical objects. However, by denying the presence of any immutable essences in physical objects, the alternative logically commits to the proposition the nature and structure physical objects evolve with time – and therefore, the physical objects of the distant past must be described by a set of laws different from the present set of laws, as the objects under description, differs. 
What is worse, alas, is that alternative two is perfectly compatible with the theory of Evolution – any theory of Evolution – for the theory of Evolution in the broadest sense, presupposes change in the nature and structure of physical objects. But this consistency is bought at a high price: because the set of laws describing the present state of affairs differs from the set of laws describing the past state of affairs on the basis the present and past state of affairs are not the same, the laws of the present cannot help in knowledge of the past. But if we cannot know the past using the present set of physical laws; how else will we know the Evolutionary Past?

So let us consider the first alternative. How about the first alternative: the proposition scientific laws are immutable – meaning, physical objects do not change in their structure and composition across time and space? It appears to me that this proposition, simplistically stated, is starkly contradictory to Evolutionary theory – to any theory of Evolution infact, for this alternative is committed to the proposition objects and facts have essences. 

Herein I maybe accused of simplifying the issue; I may be taught the lesson about how a physical object has two compositions in the Lockean sense – secondary and primary qualities​[21]​; and that, while the secondary qualities change across time, the primary qualities do not. Which is to say: the primary structure of a physical object – say, the structure of a gene – remains the same, while the secondary structure continually evolves. The primary structure of a human gene maybe its ability to replicate – and this structure never changes; but the secondary structure maybe its double helix structure or say, its directionality, which exhibit changes both long term and short term​[22]​. 
But this obviously raises an important question: why must the secondary structure evolve but not the primary structure​[23]​? Not only is there no scientific answer to this question except to retreat to the idea the primary structure is the object’s essence, primary structures do seem to evolve in actual instances. The walls of a grant monolith, for example, may collapse within a hundred years, while the pillars may remain standing for a thousand years. In this example, the walls maybe seen as the building’s secondary structure and the pillars as the building’s primary structure; but the point is that, while the walls collapse faster than the pillars, the pillars still collapse. 
In like manner, the structural composition of a cell’s nucleus may remain intact for a very, very long time – but still, it changes (or evolves). So, when the temporal duration stretches, from the evolutionary perspective, there is no difference between primary and secondary structures: both structures still evolve. 

But here lies the catch: if the primary structure of objects too evolves, we cannot know anything about the Evolutionary Past when the primary structure was different from what it is in the Evolutionary present. This point was already made; but let me take an illustrative example to drive the argument home. 
How do we know the half-life of a samarium-147, is billions of years old? Obviously we cannot know it by any of the five evidential sources we already mentioned – for the stretch of these sources, cover only the Evolutionary Present. How then do we know of a samarium-147’s decay rate? On the basis of, well, say, observational data collected concerning exploding supernova’s of the distant past, where the samarium-147’s decay rate is preserved, so to speak. But this explanation presupposes the constancy of the speed of light across space and time (that it is in light’s essence to travel at 186,000 m/s) and the expansion of galaxies at a certain rate. 
In which case the question becomes: how do we then know the speed of light remains constant across the entire age of the universe? This brings us to the notion of physical constants, where light is considered to have a constant velocity value (among other physical constants). To answer the question posted, the scientist needs to appeal to some other ‘evidence’ – evidences whose value again depends upon some other physical constants, like G. The question will then become: how do we know the gravitational constant remains constant across space and time? But then, this question may itself be circular for the simple reason the gravitational constant is the value, or standard, by which the space-time continuum itself is measured. 
The moral of the entire story is simple: either we assume some values to be physically constant (in which case their values do not evolve in time), or we reason in a circle. Why reason in a circle? Because the physical parameters the palaeontologist or geologist used for measuring changes across time, is assumed to be constant and reliable by the physicist; whereas the physicist, when asked how he knows the physical constants to be invariant, may in turn appeal to the palaeontologist and say he knows the physical constants to be constant on the basis of some geological facts (whose factual status, of course, depends upon the physical constants in its turn). 

The only way to escape this disjunctive trap is if we reject the idea the physical constants are constant at all, and embrace the possibility the physical constants do, infact, evolve – a possibility which is infact consistent with the theory of cosmological evolution. But if the physical constants change across time, we are then at a loss on how to know the distant past, for it is the very assumption of their invariance that enables us to measure the age of objects and things of the Evolutionary Past. 
This means we are left in a logical dilemma: either we assume the physical constants do not change (which in any case contravenes the theory of evolution at the most general level), or we accept the physical constants do change – in which case we will be left with no means to study the past, for it is their very invariance which helps us determine the age of physical objects. Either way, the answer is unacceptable – which will lead to the terrifying conclusion: we cannot know even in principle the Evolutionary Past! 

Obviously, something must be wrong in our reasoning; something must be terribly wrong. But where? If I am right and a theory is epistemically unjustifiable, there is no reason why they must be ontologically accepted. To accept that kind of theory is therefore no longer rational, but the one who accepts do so either faithfully blindly or simply mystically religiously. 

Let the reader be reminded that the critique is not against any particular theory of Evolution, but against the very idea of evolution across very, very huge timelines. More precisely, it is not an argument to the effect evolution does not occur in the evolutionary past; but that if evolution does occur, we have no means of knowing it. For, in order to know the Evolutionary Past, we have to unreasonably assume there are physical parameters that remains constant and by which means the past maybe studied. Alas! To say this is to deny evolution of certain things itself; but if one were to concede this, the question would then become: why must the physical constants be constant at all?
Here the scientist may retreat to the retort “we do not have any empirical evidence the physical constants ever change across time”. But this retort is by no means justifiable because it is circular – because in this context, any notion of evidence already presupposes the invariance of these constants. To demand ‘evidence’ for the evolution in the value of the physical constants is no different from a juror demanding the proof that Article 1 of the constitution is constitutional, where article 1 serves as the basis of the constitution itself. 
This means that, in order to know the distant past, we have to assume some physical constants to be constant indeed; but everyone must know this is nothing more than an assumption, and making this assumption is rather an epistemic necessity. Which is where the trouble begins: for the religious may consider it an epistemic necessity to assume God exists in order to know the meaning of eschatological revelations that a prophet receives. So, at the rock bottom, it appears the scientist is no different from the theologian in that both persons’ axioms are unjustifiable and unfortunately, not self-evidently true either. 

The argument so far made, is epistemic rather than ontological: but ontological criticisms can themselves be made, if we are to assume the laws of thought are themselves the laws governing being. 
If under the rubric of the “laws of thought” we place the reverent laws of logic and of mathematics, then we have to ask: do these laws themselves evolve? If we say they have evolved (as some philosopher like Quine would like to accept its theoretical possibility), in that case reality would itself be unreal, for the very structure of reality presupposes the operation of these formal laws, thereby making our statements nonsensical. If we must say they have not evolved and they will not, in that case we have to ask: why not? Most importantly, the answer we receive, howsoever reasonable, will either be against any theory of general evolution, or that there is a suprasensible abstract world where these laws are immutable – which, in the long run, is again against the theory of evolution. 

Finally, we are now in a position to critique the very concept of Evolution itself. Like everyone else, I do not deny that things evolve – my computer itself has “evolved” from a really good state to a really bad state in a matter of really few years; and like most people, I accept there are some things which do not evolve (like the physical constants). But let not the man who accepts the invariance of the physical constants (among other invariances) come up with any patronizing nonsense to the effect there is a rational ground for accepting their constancy: the only ‘justifiable’ reason for accepting the physical constants to be constant, is that it would be impossible for us to know the past were we to consider them variant. 

However, in the end, it is not just the physical constants that must be accepted as constant. The law of natural selection among the species, for example, must be accepted as valid for as long as species continue to survive. 
But why must this law which hold good today, hold good also in the Evolutionary Past? Some may cite the evidence of fossils, and further cite radioactive dating to the effect these have proven to a high degree of certitude the law of natural selection did work those many aeons ago. But is this reasoning is unacceptable? There are several objections to consider.
Firstly, because the study of fossil records itself presuppose the law of natural selection: natural selection is not a consequent of the evidence, but a prerequisite for interpreting the evidence. 
Secondly, we make a temporal, inductive generalization that is unjustifiable. The palaeontologist dates the age of fossils using, say, the rate of radioactive decay of the elements in the fossil in question, and on the basis of that rate, assigns a temporal value to it. But how do we know the rate of decay of, say, a carbon-14 isotope, is n at t1 and n1 at t2 and n3 at t3? Either we have to say the rate of decay has been observed to consistently follow this and this pattern since the time the first observation of its decay rate was made and by that result, extrapolate that pattern to the entire span of time and say the decay rate consistently proceeds at this and this rate; or say an isotope’s rate of decay cannot be otherwise – thereby unjustifiably giving the isotope a particular essence; or in the end, rationally admit our ignorance.
Third, the fossil record is, by its very nature, incomplete and cannot be complete. Even if we were to assume the interpretation of the fossils as interpreted today to be methodologically sound, one must admit the epistemic impossibility of knowing some ancient species and their characters. For example, there is no way of knowing if a long-gone species has skin because the fossil record cannot preserve tissues​[24]​; there is no way 
of knowing if an animal speaks or has 5 eyes and 12 ears, etc. etc. 
Most importantly, fossil records cannot even substantiate the central tenet of biological evolution – the assumption that organisms do reproduce! In order to make fossil records support the reproduction of organisms, we have to assume the reproductive organs of organisms millions and billions of years ago are more or less similar to the reproductive organs of organisms alive today, such as us (in which case one may say the physiological or anatomical structure of reproduction resists evolution) – a questionable assumption given the length of time involved and the amount of change that can take place within that time. Or one may say that the fossil records somehow preserve evidence of the presence of reproductive organs – a feeble argument as it is hard to imagine how fossils can do that job. Or in the end, we may assume a metaphysical intuition, and suggest that we will not be here had these the species to whom the fossils in concern belongs, do not reproduce. But this final argument, or intuition, is hardly tenable, for it maybe the case the fossils of species that do survive are just one single generation who die out because they cannot reproduce; or that their evolution is unconnected with ours, in which case those fossils may simply be species that do not undergo any evolution at the macro level. Whatever the case is, we can only speculate, and empirical data cannot help us. 

Also, I’d like to appeal to the TPE principle, or the Temporal Progression of Evolutionary Evidence. If this principle is theoretically sound, then, theoretically speaking, the more distant the past, the more ignorant we are of those events. This means we are most ignorant about the origin of species in the context of species, the origin of planets in the context of planets, and the origin of the universe in the context of the universe. While this maybe an undue generalization and a gross use of the TPE principle, I do not find the use anymore unjustifiable than the application of the law of natural selection to the entire span of life in the evolutionary history of organisms: the only difference is that natural selection is justified on the basis of fossil evidences and (atleast) has a semblance of being empirically confirmed; while the Temporal progression of evolutionary evidence, basis its strength on the basis of an investigation concerning the different types of evolution (this principle also has a semblance of being empirically confirmed).  

There is one final argument I’d like to make: the possibility that any theory of Evolution is self-refuting in the long run. Underlying any concept of evolution is the concept of change: and the basis of this concept is the evolution of both organic and inorganic matter. This means that the concept of evolution is empirically based; it also means any theory of evolution is true (supposing it is true) because empirical evidence backs up the theory. 
However, if the theory of evolution is true, the theory must logically predict organisms would themselves continue to evolve in the future – and, we may say, in the very distant future where organisms are so entirely different from the present organisms, a theory of evolution entirely different from any theory of evolution we have today, would have to explain that set of new state of affairs. 
This means that, in the long run, any theory we have today will themselves become obsolete and be superseded and therefore, they will all be false, because the facts of today will be different from the facts of distant tomorrow. Meaning that, if any theory of evolution is true, because of its truth, that theory evolution will one day be false!




















^1	  This type of evolution, like the other two to follow, is of course beset with metaphysical problems at a more fundamental level, but I forgo them as it is irrelevant to the present purpose. For a study of change at this level, see Barry Dainton, Time and Space (2001) and Huw Price’s Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point (1996).
^2	  I’m not interested in knowing whether the accounts we actually receive do really faithfully portray the state of historical events; I assume that, for the present purpose, they do faithfully portray such events and therefore, are reliable. The point is not of their reliability or unreliability: the point is that they can be recorded. 
^3	  Unless otherwise specified, most of the examples provided here will be suggestive and takes the conditional form: where the accuracy examples do really matter, it will be specified. Nicholas Wade wrote to the effect “some profound change in the evolution of language took place around 50,000 years ago among the Neanderthals” – while this particular date is immaterial, I take this statement to be supposedly true. Whether we push the actual timeline to 100,000 years is also immaterial; like I said, the actual fact is irrelevant to the argument, and most of my examples will be illustrative in this sense. 
^4	  Perhaps in future our present sensory faculties will either be so advanced the process of physiological growth may itself be observable; or technology will help us discover new, more powerful sense organs aside from the 5 we presently have, by which means we will sensibly observe not-too-rapid type of change; and it is even possible there are some species already equipped with the necessary sense organs that help them observe the type of change in question. If and whenever that happens, (ii) type of change will simply be absorbed into the (i) type. 
^5	  Obviously, this is not true in particular instances. I, for one, have never seen the replacement of cells (the biologist/physician alone has that advantage); this means that, so far as I’m concerned, Type 2 Evolution is better substantiated than type 1. But this fact is beside the point: potentially, Type 1 has a better chance of being substantiated than type 2 because type 1 potentially has more ‘evidential sources’ than type 2 Evolution.
^6	  Granted, sometimes sensory evidence is deceptive, and memory of the past can correct misperception. And so on with the other sources. But that is not the point; the point is that, for whatever reason, at their best, sensory evidence provides the strongest epistemic justification while oral tradition, the weakest. For the interested, J.J Valberg’s Puzzle of Experience (1992) is a good introduction to the deceptiveness of perception and all else involved. 
^7	  These problems are certainly relevant at some level for our investigation; but they are more relevant in a general sense than in the particular sense, because the problem of scientific progress has been dealt ad nauseam by the most capable philosophers of science, beginning with Popper. Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations, T. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and most flamboyantly, Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method, best articulates the nature of the problems involved. 
^8	  Atleast 4 versions of Causality are detectable in Hume’s writings, and Kant provides a fifth. But all these versions presuppose as a bedrock the very general explication provided here, so I shall not digress. P. Guyer’s Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987) provides a good discussion on the controversies surrounding causality – although the treatment of causality in the post-quantum revolution, is lacking in the book.
^9	  This definition apparently precludes much of Quantum Theory in that quantum events do not behave as causal events in the way Causality is roughly outlined above. This defect does not impinge on our present issue as Quantum Mechanics presently has no direct use in the study of change across geological or cosmological time; however, since our knowledge of the Quantum world is still dependent on empirical observations, the issue will be dealt with shortly. 
^10	  In the interest of simplicity and succinctness, I assume in this passage a cumulative understanding of science and bypass the Kuhnian revolution and what follows: that is, I assume the simplistic philosophy of Science as it stood in the 1930s, because my argument will still apply to this understand in any case. 
^11	  For a substantive treatment of the issue, see J. Pearl’s Causality (2000) and R.H Steuer’s “Observation, Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science” (2000)
^12	  The philosophical literature on “what it is to be a scientific law?” is simply enormous. Nelson Goodman’s famous argument (1947) that there is a relationship between inductive knowledge and scientific laws, is accepted here for its relevance – although, as will be later seen, even if the supposed correlation between a scientific law and the inductive evidence supporting that law, is denied, my arguments to be made, will still hold ground. 
^13	  The fallacy of converse error is not committed here because the relationship between observations and experiments on the one hand and of scientific laws on the other, is not a causal one: but that scientific laws are simply generalized statements that give account of the observations and the results of experiments in question. The relationship is between a universal and its instantiation. 
^14	  The science here is weak, but no matter, that is irrelevant to the issue under investigation. This statement is a commonsensical reference to the operation of the law of gravitation.
^15	  I do not wish to quarrel with the Humean insight nobody actually sees in point of fact the actual operations of causality. I certainly concur with Hume when he noted that it is impossible for one to observe a cause-and-effect association between two events; and certainly, it is impossible to see gravity at work, because gravity per se is unobservable. Although perhaps unwarranted, for the present purpose I shall simply bypass the Humean critique of causality and assume that, because we purportedly see causal operations on the basis of supposed caused and effects; because we purportedly observe that planets would not have been effected in their orbit the way they are were the sun’s gravity that cause its orbital movements to either strengthen or lessen, we may consider gravity to be a phenomenon of observation and so, causality itself maybe considered an empirical concept.
^16	  The word “epistemic” is crucially important, for I do not wish to fall into the idealistic trap of identifying epistemic properties with ontological truth or vice-versa. It must be understood that I do not mean to say the planets would not have moved were there no one to observe it, but that, were it not possible for someone to observe the gravitational effects and the movement of planets, we would not have known of such fact as that the planets move around the sun. To generalize this proposition, it means that, although the presence of an observer is not required for an observation to be true, and although a fact such as the movement of planets need not be observed in order for such fact to be true, were it not possible for us to observe such movements, even in principle, it will be empirically impossible for us to know of such facts. This is a point of epistemology, not ontology: I am not talking about the state of affairs of the universe, but our knowledge of the state of affairs of the universe. And it is my argument our knowledge of the state of affairs of the universe, atleast partially but necessarily, derives its legitimacy from the fact that such state of affairs can be observed by us; and because we can observe it, the legitimacy of empirical knowledge is partially but necessarily dependent on the evidence of our senses. 
^17	  In this statement, I assume “truth” to be the property of the knower, not of the known; the property of the known maybe designated as “fact”. 
^18	  I do not find it necessary to deal with Popper’s critique of induction as the argument will still hold if Popper’s falsification is used instead of induction and induction is bypassed the way Popper bypassed it.
^19	  It is the task of the physicist, not mine, to explain how birds ‘defy’ gravity. This will be a home run’ hit for the physicist, not my concern.
^20	  This is historically inaccurate, but historical accuracy is neither the primary nor secondary concern and is simply irrelevant.
^21	  This distinction mirrors the distinction between micro and macro types of evolution. However, I prefer primary and secondary over these more or less biological terms because ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ have a greater metaphysical appeal, and the type of evolution discussed here is patently not just confined to biological evolution, but to any type of evolution that takes place in the physical universe. 
^22	  This example is just suggestive to elucidate the concepts of primary and secondary structures/attributes. 
^23	  We maybe sure the genes’ ability to replicate is always there, for if this ability did not exist from the beginning, logic dictates there won’t be any genes around; but there is no reason to assume this replicating ability will continue forever for as long as there are genes. In any case, it remains to be explained why genes always replicate. 
^24	  When we recover a fossil that records the presence of, say, a backbone, there is no way of telling if that species is has pigmentation except the unwarranted assumption all boned species are pigmented (there is no way to tell if this assumption holds true during the evolutionary past although it is certainly true in the evolutionary present). 
